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ABSTRACT

McCarty, Tanner Joseph. M.S., Purdue University, December 2014. Uncertainty,
Irreversibility, and Investment in Second-Generation Biofuels. Major Professor: Juan P.
Sesmero.

The present study formalizes and quantifies the importance of uncertainty for
investment in a corn-stover based cellulosic biofuel plant. Using a real options model we
recover prices of gasoline that would trigger entry into the market and calculate the portion
of that entry trigger price required to cover cost and the portion that corresponds to risk
premium. We then discuss the effect of managerial flexibility on the entry risk premium
and the prices of gasoline that would trigger mothballing, reactivation, and exit. Results
show that the risk premium required by plants to enter the second-generation biofuel
market is likely to be substantial. The analysis also reveals that a break-even approach
(which ignores the portion of entry price composed of risk premium), and the traditional
Marshallian approach (which ignores the portion of entry price composed of both the risk
premium and the drift rate), would significantly underestimate the gasoline entry trigger
price and the magnitude of that underestimation increases as both volatility and mean of
gasoline prices increase. Results also uncover a great deal of hysteresis (i.e. a range of
gasoline prices for which there is neither entry nor exit in the market) in entry/exit behavior
by plants. Hysteresis increases as gasoline prices become more volatile. Hysteresis
suggests that, at the industry level, positive (negative) demand shocks will have a
significant impact on prices (production) and a limited impact on production (prices). In
combination all of these results suggest that policies supporting second generation biofuels
may have fallen short of their targets because of their failure to alleviate uncertainty.

1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

While analyses of the economic viability of cellulosic biofuels suggest a positive
net present value (NPV) of such investments, entry into the market has not occurred at the
pace set by the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The present study quantitatively evaluates
the hypothesis that, due to the uncertain and irreversible nature of investment in this
industry, investors require a non-trivial premium on expected profitability to enter the
market1. We also hypothesize that managerial flexibility (the possibility of mothballing
and reactivation) may reduce such premium. Results from a parameterized real options
(RO) analysis suggest a premium of 72% in expected profitability revealing that
uncertainty creates a significant barrier to entry. Managerial flexibility does not have a
significant (negative) effect on entry trigger price but, it does have a slightly more
important (negative) effect on exit trigger price.
Moreover, results also suggest a potential for significant hysteresis once
investments have been made; i.e. plants will require larger losses before shutting down
operations. Hysteresis is aggravated by higher levels of uncertainty and irreversibility. We
argue that renewable fuel standards are not effective in addressing uncertainty and that
alternative or complementary policy instruments may be required to induce the level of
investment mandated by the second renewable fuel standard (RFS2). Alternative policy
options are discussed.
We also compare Marshallian entry and exit trigger prices to our real options
analysis. Marshallian trigger prices are calculated at the long run average cost and long run

1

It is important to note that with an industry such as biofuel, that experiences such large volatility, a price
that breaks even (brings the NPV to zero) does not necessarily mean entry. Investors would require a return
higher than normal to agree to take on the large amount of uncertainty. This shortfall will be addressed later
in the paper. This drawback of break-even does not mean that break-even has no value, it is very good at
isolating the amount of premium in real options composed of uncertainty.
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variable cost that dictate entry and exit respectively. Compared to a break-even approach,
these likely over-state both the entry and exit price due to the omission of the drift rate.
However economic entry and exit theory is based on these assumptions and they provide
another comparison for real options. Even with these entry/exit prices that are higher than
break-even their still existed a premium between Marshallian and real option entry/exit
prices. A firm required a 48% premium for RO entry, and once active would operate until
prices dropped 30% lower the Marshallian exit price to leave.
Over the past decade, the United States has increasingly pushed for the
development of economical forms of renewable fuels. This is due to increased concerns
over climate change, energy security, and the desire for domestic job creation. Biofuels in
particular, and lately cellulosic biofuels, have received a large amount of attention due to
their potential benefits in addressing these problems. The first renewable fuel standard was
established in 2005, and expanded to the form used today with the passage of the RFS2 in
2007. The RFS2 requires by the year 2022, 36 billion gallons of biofuel (ethanol
equivalent) to be used annually within the United States, 16 billion of which must come
from cellulosic sources. It also sets a cap on the maximum amount of biofuel from corn
ethanol at 15 billion gallons. Despite many positive projections, cellulosic biofuel
production has continually fallen well short of mandates set forth by RFS2. In 2013,
cellulosic biofuel production totaled six million gallons. This falls 994 million gallons
below the target goal of 1 billion gallons for the year set by the Second Renewable Fuel
Standard (Schnepf and Yacobucci, 2010).
Numerous studies, in both business and academic realms, have used a net present
value and/or break-even analysis to predict the price required to make cellulosic biofuel
profitable. Using this approach, these studies routinely find that a cellulosic biofuel plant
built today should have a positive return on the investment (Anex, et al., 2010, Brown and
Brown, 2013, Brown, et al., 2013, Digest, 2013, Gonzalez, et al., 2012, Jones, et al., 2009,
Petter and Tyner, 2014). Without accounting for risk it is hard to reconcile the reality of
biofuel production with predictions of profitability by economic studies. We hypothesize
that the inconsistency between theoretical predictions and empirical observations is the
systematic underestimation, by the former, of the role of uncertainty as a barrier to
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investment. It does not appear that cellulosic biofuel production will meet the 16 billion
gallons required by 2022.
Biofuels are defined as “transportation fuels like ethanol and diesel that are made
from biomass materials” (EIA, 2013). Currently there are three main types (generations)
of biofuels. First generation biofuels are produced from the sugars found in crops such as
corn or sugar cane. These sugars are processed through various pathways to produce
ethanol which is then blended with gasoline. Second generation biofuels differ from first
generation since they are produced from cellulosic plant matter such as corn stover, switch
grass, or trees rather than sugar(EIA, 2013). They have also recently advanced to the point
where the process produces a gasoline or diesel equivalent fuel referred to as a “drop in”
instead of ethanol, which is subject to blending limits. Most existing second generation
plants do produce ethanol, however, since converting biofuels to “drop in” is a recent
development (EIA, 2013). Third generation biofuels typically use algae or bacteria to break
down a cellulosic feedstock to produce biodiesel (Carere, et al., 2008).
This paper focuses on second-generation drop-ins. The advantage of a drop in is
that existing combustion engines can burn it without any modifications. This chemical
similarity to petroleum-derived fuels gives second-generation biofuels an advantage over
ethanol as it eliminates constraints on blending (Tyner, et al., 2011). Nine trillion dollars’
worth of transportation infrastructure exists in the United States to handle petroleum-based
products (Halog and Bortsie-Aryee, 2013). Pipelines cannot transport ethanol and most
cars cannot burn a mixture that contains more than ten to fifteen percent ethanol without
damaging the engine (Blanco and Isenhouer, 2010, Tyner and Taheripour, 2014).
Typically large-scale investment projects such as second generation biofuel
refineries must pass some kind of cost-benefit analysis to judge the profitability of the
investment before construction can be started. Usually, a net present value analysis is used.
While this can be useful in established stable industries, evaluating investment in a new
industry that experiences large amounts of uncertainty from both technical and market
sources requires consideration of the effects of uncertainty on entry and exit behavior (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994, Gonzalez, et al., 2012). This uncertainty translates into a value, for
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having the option to wait to make a decision. Waiting allows the decision maker to observe
the evolution of random variables and re-assess the risk associated with the investment.2
One way of formalizing and quantifying the value of waiting and, consequently,
the role of uncertainty in entry trigger prices is using a real options analysis. Factoring
uncertainty into the cost/benefit analysis for entry into the biofuel supply chain has recently
gained popularity (Brandão, et al., 2009, Burke, 2012, Pederson and Zou, 2009, Schmit, et
al., 2009, Song, et al.) but this approach has not been applied to the analysis of investment
in a second generation drop-in biofuel plants. This paper fills this gap by developing a real
options model of a plant’s decision making for optimal entry, exit, mothball, and
reactivation trigger prices for a second-generation corn stover fed biofuel plant. Moreover,
we calculate entry and exit trigger prices with a real options model that ignores the
managerial flexibility embedded in mothball and reactivation. Solving a real options model
with and without mothball and reactivation allows identification of the risk premium
required by investors to enter the market and the offsetting effect of managerial flexibility.
In particular, the difference in trigger prices between the break-even approach and
real options without considering mothballing and reactivation permits quantification of the
effect of uncertainty on entry trigger price. In turn this will reveal the magnitude of the
underestimation of uncertainty, embedded in the break-even approach which may explain
the puzzling difference between predictions of profitability and absence of entry into the
industry. On the other hand the difference in trigger prices between real options with
mothball and reactivation and real options without these intermediate states permits
quantification of the effect of managerial flexibility, given uncertainty and irreversibility,
on the risk premium that investors require to enter the market.

2

It is important to note that it is possible to build uncertainty into an NPV analysis. More specifically one
can specify a percent chance of economic loss that is acceptable and build that into the trigger price for entry.
This will yield a positive NPV. This qualification will create a trigger price for entry that is higher than the
break-even price. In this paper, unless otherwise specified, we compare real options trigger price for entry
(exit) to break-even and (Marshelian exit prices). We also create a situation with an 80% chance of economic
gain to be compared to the break even and real option scenarios; this will be discussed later.
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CHAPTER 2: METHODS

As mentioned earlier, this paper compares the entry and exit trigger prices for a real
options framework to an NPV break-even framework to come up with a price premium for
uncertainty. The break-even model is centered on standard discounting. Revenue and costs
are discounted for the future at a pre-specified discount rate. The summation of all of these
expected discounted values are put together to come up with the value of a project in
today’s dollars. Under NPV break-even assumptions a firm will enter the market if their
discounted price is greater than or equal to their discounted operating cost plus capital
expenditure. This equality is written as

𝑊ℎ
𝛿−µ

≥

𝑤
𝛿

+ 𝑘. 𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ denotes the trigger price per

gallon for entry, 𝛿 the discount rate, µ the drift rate in price, 𝑤 the operating cost per gallon,
and 𝑘 the capital cost per gallon of plant capacity. A firm will exit the market if the
discounted price falls below discounted operating cost plus the net scrap value of selling
the plant. In other words a firm will leave if the present value of its revenue cannot cover
the present value of its operating cost plus scrap value for selling. This equality is written
as

𝑊𝑙

≦
𝛿−µ

𝑤
𝛿

+ 𝑙. 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑙 denotes the trigger price per gallon for exit and 𝑙 the net scrap value

of selling the plant.
We also compare RO entry and exit to Marshallian entry and exit. Under
Marshallian assumptions, a firm will enter if its average price can cover its average cost.
More specifically, the Marshallian entry trigger price, 𝑊ℎ , is the long run average cost,
composed of operating cost 𝑤 and the interest 𝑟 on sunk capital cost 𝑘. Entry occurs when
𝑊ℎ ≥ 𝑤 + 𝑟𝑘. The Marshallian exit trigger price 𝑊𝑙 is the operating cost 𝑤 plus the
interest 𝑟 on scrap value 𝑙. Exit occurs when 𝑊𝑙 < 𝑤 + 𝑟𝑙 (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). While
NPV-break even assumptions are more comparable to real options they can leave
ambiguity for what the actual entry/exit prices will actually be when they deal with an
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industry experiencing large amounts of uncertainty. 3 While Marshallian entry/exit diverges
from both the assumptions of uncertainty and drift, it does provide an unambiguous entry
and exit point anchored in rigorously proven economic theory.

Real Options Defined
The real options analysis and corresponding intuition used in this paper is taken
from (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The process has already been developed but the rest of
this chapter is dedicated to explaining and showing how real options affect trigger prices
for entry and operation. Real options are to project investment, what financial options are
to stock or commodity investment. Both of these options give the right but not the
obligation to make a decision in the future. This right without obligation mitigates the
downside risk associated with an investment project while still allowing to capitalize from
the upside. The value of this option is captured and quantified in a real options analysis.
For the option to invest to have value (i.e. for the real options approach to differ from the
break-even approach), three conditions must hold:
1. Investment cost is either fully or partially irreversible.
2. The future evolution of one of the variables in the model is uncertain.
3. Timing of the investment can be controlled.
Biofuel plants are large investments that have little reversibility. Much of the
equipment is specific to the industry. A tank used for pyrolysis may cost millions of dollars
by the time it is installed but if the industry becomes unprofitable it does not have many
other uses. For instance if one plant becomes unprofitable due to a systemic risk in the
industry, such as low gasoline prices, the only other firms that would be interested in
purchasing a pyrolysis tank would be firms in the same industry. They however would not
buy it upon the initial plant’s exit for anywhere near its purchase price since they are also
experiencing low prices and as a result are in a similar position.
Wholesale gasoline price per gallon is used as a proxy for the price received for a
gallon of drop in biofuel. Using, converting, and logging monthly data covering the past

3

As mentioned previously, it is important to note that NPV can account for uncertainty by specifying a
percentage chance for economic profit, but this in itself leads to the problem of specifying what percent of
gain would induce entry.
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five years from the EIA (U.S. Energy Information Administration), the average annual
standard deviation for a percentage change in wholesale gasoline selling price was found
to be 0.209. Such deviations would cause drastic swings in a biofuel producer’s revenue.
An increase or decrease in prices by even a portion of the standard deviation could make
or break a plant. This standard deviation in price satisfies the uncertainty requirement for
real options. Finally, the timing of an investment in a second-generation corn stover fed
bio-gasoline plant is fairly flexible.
There are no real barriers to entry other than the high capital cost associated with
commercial scale plants and preliminary pilot plants, which is not timing sensitive. The
only time sensitive variable in a second generation bio-fuel plant is the potential change in
tax policy. If subsidies and tax credits continue to change they may shut the window on
entry.
There is one additional assumption that must hold within the model. It was not
mentioned earlier since it has to do with the way the model is set up and not with how the
variables and parameters exist in the real world. The project must be assumed to have an
infinite life. This assumption must hold to satisfy the smooth pasting conditions of the
equalities. This assumption is accounted for by replacing capital as quickly as it
depreciates. This replacement cost gets built into operating cost. This infinite project life,
while necessary, has two offsetting effects compared to a traditional break-even analysis.
Building in capital depreciation costs into operating costs will raise the trigger price since
it essentially doubles capital cost. A producer must pay capital cost to start the plant and
then an annual payment of capital cost for the infinite life of the plant. The infinite life also
lowers the trigger price in the sense that price has a positive trend, costs do not. Getting
higher prices for an infinite life compared to say 20 years will decrease the trigger price.

Decisions for Entry, Mothball, Reactivation, and Exit
There are three different states a plant can be in: idle, active, or mothballed. In an
idle state, a plant is not paying either fixed or capital costs since it has not been built yet. It
is also not receiving income but has the option of activating in the future. An active plant
pays an investment cost 𝑘 to enter the market and then, every period, pays operating costs
𝑤, and, earns revenue 𝑃. An active plant also has the option of converting to a mothballed
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state. To get to a mothballed state an active plant must pay a fixed cost of 𝐸𝑚 and pays an
ongoing operating mothball maintenance cost 𝑚 to keep the plant in working order should
it decide to use its option of reactivating to active in the future for a fixed cost 𝑟. In a
mothballed state a plant also has the option of exiting the industry. In the event that the
firm decides to exit the market, it forfeits its mothball maintenance cost, and gets a fraction
of the initial capital, 𝑙, back. The plant would incur some costs for exiting but after
combining them with the value it gets for selling the plant we assume 𝑙 to be positive. It
also loses its option to reactivate. The ability to switch between these different states is
represented in Table 2.1. X is possible, - is not.
Table 2.1: Possible Plant States to Switch Between.
Idle

Active

Mothballed

Idle

-

X

-

Active

-

-

X

Mothballed

X

X

-

There are several assumptions that must hold for this model to function. We assume
𝑙 < 𝑘. We also assume that 𝑤 < 𝑚,otherwise the firm will never mothball (Schmit, et al.,
2009). Similarly, it is necessary for 𝑟 < 𝑘, otherwise it would never be optimal to mothball
and reactivate later since it would always be cheaper to exit and then enter again.
The output prices that trigger entry, mothball, exit, and reactivation when the option
of waiting to make the investment is factored (real options) in are denoted by 𝑃ℎ , 𝑃𝑚 , 𝑃𝑟 ,
and 𝑃𝑙 respectively.. The output prices that trigger entry and exit when waiting is not an
option (break-even) are denoted by 𝑊ℎ and 𝑊𝑙 respectively.
Price per gallon 𝑃 is the wholesale price of a gallon of bio-gasoline. This price is
assumed to change over time according to a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) process.4
This process not only changes over time but is also continuous in time. In other words
4

This assumption is supported by statistical tests conducted with historical gasoline price data. Tests will be
presented and discussed in detail in Section 3.1.
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decisions can be made at infinitesimally small units of time. GBM is a stochastic process
that incorporates both a drift parameter and a variance parameter for making predictions in
future prices. The equation for this is denoted as 𝑑𝑃 = µ𝑃𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑃𝑑𝑧. A change in price
(𝑑𝑃) is dependent upon its drift rate and its variability. Drift rate grows over a time
increment (𝑑𝑡). The standard deviation is tied to the increment of a Weiner process denoted
by 𝑑𝑧, which is a function of time and variability, = 𝜀𝑡 √𝑑𝑡 . The factor 𝜀𝑡 is a normally
distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1, so the
expected value of 𝑑𝑧 = 0. 𝑃 follows a normal distribution. Gasoline prices have typically
been characterized by log-normal distributions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Gasoline prices
enter our model in log form. Given log-normality of gasoline price, the log of gasoline
price is characterized by a normal distribution. It is also assumed that the discount rate 𝛿 is
greater than the drift rate µ. This must hold otherwise it would never be optimal to invest
since the growth rate would outpace the discount rate. It would always be possible to do
“better” by waiting longer.

The Decision to Enter
Let us denote an idle project’s discounted expected value by 𝑉0 (𝑃). For an idle
plant, this value is completely based off of the option for the firm to enter the industry in
the future. An idle plant has no revenue or expenses, but has the option of earning a profit
in the future if the option is exercised and the plant is brought to an active state. An investor
that owns a plant in an idle state could do one of two things, hold onto the option and
activate the plant if prices are sufficiently high or sell the option to someone else and invest
the proceeds. The former is represented by the equation 𝐸𝑡 [𝑑𝑉0 (𝑃)]𝑑𝑡 −1, where 𝜀𝑡 is the
expected value of the project at time 𝑡. The latter is represented by the function 𝛿𝑉0 (𝑃).
Think of the left hand side as the return generated from selling the project and investing
the proceeds. The right hand side is the expected capital gain of the project. Arbitrage in
efficient markets would set these two returns equal:
𝛿𝑉0 (𝑃) = 𝐸𝑡 [𝑑𝑉0 (𝑃)]𝑑𝑡 −1

(1)
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Equation one is a Bellman equation and it must hold under efficient markets.
Equation (1) implicitly defines the entry trigger price. To solve for this price we first need
to find an expression for 𝑑𝑉0 (𝑃). This expression reveals that the value of the project is a
function of gasoline price which is, in turn, a random variable following a geometric
Brownian motion (BM) process. To obtain an expression for solve this we make use of
1 𝜕𝑖 𝑉

𝑖
Ito’s Lemma. Ito’s Lemma is, in essence, a Taylor series expansion 𝑑𝑉 = ∑∞
𝑖=1 𝑖! 𝜕𝑃 𝑖 (𝑑𝑃) ,

where

𝑑𝑃 = µ𝑃𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑃𝑑𝑧. The second order term is (𝑑𝑃)2 = (µ𝑃)2 (𝑑𝑡)2 +
3

3

2(µ𝑃)(𝜎𝑃)(𝑑𝑡)2 + (𝜎𝑃)2 𝑑𝑡 which simplifies to (𝜎𝑃)2 𝑑𝑡 since (𝑑𝑡)2 and (𝑑𝑡)2 go to zero
faster than 𝑑𝑡 as 𝑑𝑡 approaches zero. Higher order terms vanish as (𝑑𝑃)3 and (𝑑𝑃)4 will
have all of their associated 𝑑𝑡 terms taken to a power higher than one and as a result will
simplify to zero. After using Ito’s Lemma we are left with:
𝜕2 𝑉

𝜕𝑉

𝑑𝑉 = 𝜕𝑃 𝑑𝑃 − 2𝜕𝑃2 𝑑𝑃2

(2)

Substituting dP into (2) yields:
𝜕2 𝑉 1

𝜕𝑉

𝜕𝑉

𝑑𝑉 = 𝜕𝑃 (µ𝑃𝑑𝑡) + 𝜕𝑃2 (2 𝜎 2 𝑃2 𝑑𝑡) + 𝜕𝑃 (𝜎𝑃𝑑𝑧)

(3)

We then substitute (3) into (1) and get:
𝜕2 𝑉 1

𝜕𝑉

𝜕𝑉

𝛿𝑉0 (𝑃) = 𝐸𝑡 [𝜕𝑃 (µ𝑃𝑑𝑡) + 𝜕𝑃2 (2 𝜎 2 𝑃2 𝑑𝑡)] 𝑑𝑡 −1 + 𝜕𝑃 𝜎𝑑𝑧

(4)

equation (4) is simplified to
𝜕𝑉

𝜕2 𝑉 1

𝛿𝑉0 (𝑃) = 𝜕𝑃 (µ𝑃) + 𝜕𝑃2 (2 𝜎 2 𝑃2 )

(5)

Equation (5) constitutes a second order homogenous ordinary differential equation.
As such, it has the solution (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994):
𝑉0 = 𝐴0 𝑃−𝛼 + 𝐵0 𝑃𝛽

(6)

Where α and β are parameters that capture and incorporate the uncertainty modeled
by GBM into the model:
−𝛼 = 0.5[(1 − 2𝜇𝜎 −2 ) − ((1 − 2𝜇𝜎 −2 )2 + 8𝛿𝜎 −2 ).5 ] < 0
𝛽 = 0.5[(1 − 2𝜇𝜎 −2 ) + ((1 − 2𝜇𝜎 −2 )2 + 8𝛿𝜎 −2 ).5 ] > 1
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Where 𝐴0 and 𝐵0 are unknown constants. The term 𝐴0 𝑃−𝛼 represents the option
value of changing states if output price decreases, and 𝐵0 𝑃𝛽 represents the option value of
switching to another state if prices increase. For an idle plant we drop 𝐴0 𝑃−𝛼 since an idle
project has no value if price approaches zero. If 𝐴0 𝑃 −𝛼 approaches zero the first term
vanishes rendering the following solution to the differential equation:
𝑉0 = 𝐵0 𝑃𝛽

(7)

We now turn our attention to the decision to mothball the plant after entry has
occurred.

The Decision to Mothball
Now that we have solved for the value of a plant in an idle state 𝑉0, we look at a
plant in an active state 𝑉1. A plant in an active state is producing biofuel and earning an
ongoing net revenue stream equal to (𝑃 − 𝑤). Equilibrium in the market requires:
𝛿𝑉1 = (𝑃 − 𝑤) + 𝐸𝑡 [𝑑𝑉1 (𝑃)]𝑑𝑡 −1

(8)

Notice the similarities of the Bellman equation for an active plant equation (8) to
the Bellman equation for an idle plant equation (1). Like equation (1), equation (8) has an
option value of being able to change states but it also contains a term for both price and
operating cost to denote operating revenue. The value function 𝑉1 is derived following the
same procedure by which we derived 𝑉0. Such procedure results in:
𝑉1 (𝑃) = 𝑃(𝛿 − µ)−1 − 𝑤𝛿 −1 + 𝐴1 𝑃−𝛼 + 𝐵1 𝑃𝛽

(9)

Where 𝐴1 and 𝐵1 are unknown constants, 𝐴1 𝑃 −𝛼 and and 𝐵1 𝑃𝛽 which capture the
option value of mothballing the plant if output price decreases and the option value of
mothballing if the output price increases respectively. If the output price is sufficiently high
to induce the firm to keep the plant active, further increases in output price will make the
value of mothball vanish; i.e. 𝐵1 𝑃𝛽 =0. Therefore equation (9) simplifies to:
𝑉1 (𝑃) = 𝑃(𝛿 − µ)−1 − 𝑤𝛿 −1 + 𝐴1 𝑃−𝛼

(10)
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We now look at a situation where a firm that has a mothballed, the plant has the
option to reactivate or exit the market altogether.

The Decision to Reactivate or Exit
Now think of a plant that is currently in a mothball state. It is experiencing an
ongoing maintenance cost of 𝑚. The bellman equation for a plant in a mothballed state is:
𝛿𝑉𝑚 = 𝐸𝑡 [𝑑𝑉𝑚 (𝑃)]𝑑𝑡 −1 − 𝑚

(11)

Once again, the left hand side represents the return from selling the plant and
investing the proceeds. The right hand side represents the expected value of keeping the
project. By using the same process that was used for equations (1) and (8) this equation
converts to:
𝑉𝑚 (𝑃) = 𝐴𝑚 𝑃 −𝛼 + 𝐵𝑚 𝑃𝛽 − 𝑚𝛿 −1

(12)

Where 𝐴𝑚 and 𝐵𝑚 are unknown constants, 𝐴𝑚 𝑃−𝛼 represents the option value of
being able to exit, 𝐵𝑚 𝑃𝛽 represents the option value of being able to reactivate, 𝑚𝛿 −1
represents the present value of maintenance cost if the plant never changes states. The
option value to exit is positive only if the price decreases, and the option value to reactivate
is positive only if the price increases. This is why each option only has one term associated
with it.

Deriving the Trigger Prices
Our representative plant has the option to switch from idle to active, active to
mothballed, mothball to exit, and mothballed to active at any given point in time. Each of
these options will be exercised at a specific price which we denote by 𝑃ℎ , 𝑃𝑚 , 𝑃𝑟 , and 𝑃𝑙 ,
respectively. These prices are referred to as trigger prices. Trigger prices are characterized
by two conditions known as the value matching condition and the smooth pasting condition
at each switching point. The value matching condition states that switching from one state
to another occurs when the value of the current state becomes lower than the value of the
project under the state to which the firm would like to switch minus the fixed exercise price
(or switching cost) which we denote by 𝑘, 𝐸𝑚 , 𝑟, and 𝑙 when the firm switches to active,
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mothball, reactivation, and exit respectively. The smooth pasting condition requires these
value functions to be tangent to one another at the trigger price.
We start by looking at the trigger price for switching a biofuel plant from an idle
state to an active state. The value matching condition occurs between these two states at a
value of 𝑃ℎ that sets the value of the option to enter equal to the value of an active project
minus the fixed cost of switching states 𝑘:
𝑉0 (𝑃ℎ ) = 𝑉1 (𝑃ℎ ) − 𝑘

(13)

The corresponding smooth pasting condition between these two states is:
𝑉′0 (𝑃ℎ ) = 𝑉′1 (𝑃ℎ )

(14)

The value matching condition corresponding to the transition from active to
mothball can be denoted by:
𝑉1 (𝑃𝑚 ) = 𝑉𝑚 (𝑃𝑚 ) − 𝐸𝑚

(15)

Where 𝑃𝑚 represents the trigger price that will take a plant from an active state to a
mothballed state and 𝐸𝑚 denotes the fixed cost of mothballing. The corresponding smooth
pasting condition between active and mothballed states is:
𝑉′1 (𝑃𝑚 ) = 𝑉′𝑚 (𝑃𝑚 )

(16)

A mothball state has two options for switching states. It can change back to an
active state for a fixed reactivation cost of 𝑟. It could also change back to an idle state and
receive a net scrap value 𝑙. Since there are two options for this state there needs to be both
two value matching conditions and two smooth pasting conditions satisfied. The decision
to move from a mothballed state to an active state occurs at 𝑃𝑟 . The value matching
condition for this is:
𝑉𝑚 (𝑃𝑟 ) = 𝑉1 (𝑃𝑟 ) − 𝑟

(17)

The corresponding smooth pasting condition is:
𝑉′𝑚 (𝑃𝑟 ) = 𝑉′1 (𝑃𝑟 )

(18)

The value matching condition between a mothballed state and an idle state is:
𝑉𝑚 (𝑃𝑙 ) = 𝑉0 (𝑃𝑙 ) − 𝑙

(19)

The corresponding smooth pasting condition is:
𝑉′𝑚 (𝑃𝑙 ) = 𝑉′0 (𝑃𝑙 )

(20)

We now substitute value functions (7), (10), and (12) into their corresponding value
matching equations (13), (15), (17), and (19) at their designated trigger prices and the
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derivative of the value functions with respect to 𝑃 into the smooth-pasting equations (14),
(16), (18), and (20). These substitutions result in a nonlinear system of eight equations in
eight unknowns. Four of these unknowns are trigger prices (𝑃ℎ , 𝑃𝑚 , 𝑃𝑟 , 𝑃𝑙 ) and four
unknown constants associated with the option value of switching states (𝐴1 , 𝐴𝑚 , 𝐵0, and
𝐵𝑚 ):
𝐵0 𝑃ℎ 𝛽 = 𝑃ℎ (𝛿 − 𝜇)−1 − 𝑤𝛿 −1 + 𝐴1 𝑃ℎ 𝛼 − 𝑘

(21)

𝑃𝑚 (𝛿 − 𝜇)−1 − 𝑤𝛿 −1 + 𝐴1 𝑃𝑚 𝛼 = 𝐴𝑚 𝑃𝑚 𝛼 + 𝐵𝑚 𝑃𝛽 − 𝑚𝛿 −1 − 𝐸𝑚

(22)

𝐴𝑚 𝑃𝑟 𝛼 + 𝐵𝑚 𝑃𝑟 𝛽 − 𝑚𝛿 −1 = 𝑃𝑟 (𝛿 − 𝜇)−1 − 𝑤𝛿 −1 + 𝐴1 𝑃𝑟 𝛼 − 𝑟

(23)

𝐴𝑚 𝑃𝑙 𝛼 + 𝐵𝑚 𝑃𝑙 𝛽 − 𝑚𝛿 −1 = 𝐵0 𝑃𝑙 𝛽 − 𝑙

(24)

𝛽𝐵0 𝑃ℎ 𝛽−1 = −𝑃ℎ (𝛿 − 𝜇)−2 + 𝛼𝐴1 𝑃ℎ 𝛼−1

(25)

−𝑃𝑚 (𝛿 − 𝜇)−2 + 𝑤𝛿 −2 + 𝛼𝐴1 𝑃𝑚 𝛼−1 = 𝛼𝐴𝑚 𝑃𝑚 𝛼−1 + 𝛽𝐵𝑚 𝑃𝛽−1

(26)

𝛼𝐴𝑚 𝑃𝑟 𝛼−1 + 𝛽𝐵𝑚 𝑃𝑟 𝛽−1 + 𝑚𝛿 −2 = −𝑃𝑟 (𝛿 − 𝜇)−2 + 𝛼𝐴1 𝑃𝑟 𝛼−1

(27)

𝛼𝐴𝑚 𝑃𝑙 𝛼−1 + 𝛽𝐵𝑚 𝑃𝑙 𝛽−1 = 𝛽𝐵0 𝑃𝑙 𝛽−1

(28)

The first four equations constitute direct corollaries of the value matching
conditions and the next four equations are derived from the smooth pasting conditions.
This system is solved numerically in Matlab using the code presented in Appendix 1.
Solution of the system without managerial flexibility (i.e. without the option to mothball
and re-entry) is, in turn, presented in Appendix 2.
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CHAPTER 3: PARAMETERS AND ESTIMATION

Variable of Interest
In order to identify the stochastic process followed by gasoline price and whether
that stochastic process warrants the use of a real options approach we looked at average
monthly wholesale gasoline prices in the Midwest for the past twenty years. This data is
shown in Figure 3.1.

$4.00

Dollars per gallon real

$3.50
$3.00
$2.50
$2.00
$1.50
$1.00
$0.50
$-

Jan-2014

Jan-2013

Jan-2012

Jan-2011

Jan-2010

Jan-2009

Jan-2008

Jan-2007

Jan-2006

Jan-2005

Jan-2004

Jan-2003

Jan-2002

Jan-2001

Jan-2000

Jan-1999

Jan-1998

Jan-1997

Jan-1996

Jan-1995

Jan-1994

Jan-1993

Date

Figure 3.1: History of the Average Real Wholesale Gasoline Price in the Midwest (PADD
Area 2) (EIA, 2013)
Gasoline prices seem to have followed an upward trend in this period. In other
words there is a positive drift rate which we denote by µ. The average monthly percent
change in price in these series results in a drift rate of 0.48%. Converted to annual this term
becomes 5.7%. Despite our calculations this drift rate seems overly ambitious. It is unlikely
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that this growth in wholesale gasoline prices will continue at this rate into the future. We
chose a more modest rate based off of the EIA’s 30 year projections for wholesale gasoline
prices. This gives us a drift rate of 1.85%.
The monthly and yearly standard deviation in for a one percent change in gasoline
price over the past 20 years are 0.1 and 0.35 respectively. The standard deviation over the
last five years was 0.06 and 0.21 for monthly and yearly calculations respectively. For our
base case analysis we use the more conservative estimate of yearly standard deviation equal
to 0.21. The dramatic spikes in prices experienced in years 2004-2007, and the subsequent
crash in 2008 may overestimate the variance for future gasoline prices.
𝑃𝑡

The equation used to calculate drift and standard deviation is 𝑑𝑡 = ln(𝑃

𝑡−1

). The

data is logged since wholesale gasoline prices are assumed to be log normally distributed
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, Schmit, et al., 2009). Taking logarithm of prices converts this
log normal distribution into a normal distribution, which is consistent with GBM
assumptions. The interpretation of this logging in respect to the drift and standard deviation
are the drift is considered the average percentage change in gasoline price in a year. The
standard deviation can be interpreted as the standard deviation of a one percent change in
price. We chose to use prices in the Midwest since a stover fed plant would most likely
locate and sell there, due to the relatively high corn yields and low transportation cost to
local markets.
There is significant variation in 𝑃 from year to year. This variation in 𝑃, with
respect to time, can either evolve following a stationary or a non-stationary process. These
processes are most simply and commonly modeled using a mean reversion or Brownian
motion process respectively (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Brownian motion behaves
randomly and the price at time t depends only on the price in 𝑡 − 1, the drift rate, and the
stochastic term. Mean reversion behaves similarly except that it has an additional term that
drags future values back to a given mean or trend. This can be thought of as prices reverting
to the cost of production in the long run(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Brownian motion is
modeled as 𝑑𝑃 = µ𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑧. Where µ is the drift rate of P, σ is the standard deviation of
a percentage change in 𝑃, 𝑑𝑡 is the change in time, and dz is the increment of a Weiner
process. On the other hand, a mean reversion process is modeled as 𝑑𝑃 = ɳ(𝑃̅ − 𝑃)𝑑𝑡 +
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𝜎𝑑𝑧, where 𝑃 represents the mean value which 𝑃 tends to revert to and ɳ is the speed at
which this reversion occurs.
For Brownian motion, the price in the current period 𝑃𝑡 is a function of the price
in the preceding period 𝑃𝑡−1 , the variability of price σ, and the drift rate µ. The validity of
assuming a Brownian motion as the data generating process (DGP) of gasoline prices is
evaluated by conducting a unit root test for non-stationarity/autocorrelation of the price
series. If the price in any given period depends on the price in the previous period, then a
Dickey Fuller unit root test will fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity
(Wooldridge, 2012). Mathematically this explanation is modeled as 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1 = 𝑎 +
𝑏(𝑃𝑡−1 ) + 𝑒, 𝑃𝑡 =𝑎+𝑏(𝑃𝑡−1 )+𝑐µ+𝑒 where 𝑃𝑡 is the price in this period, 𝑃𝑡−1 is the price
lagged by one period, 𝑎 is the intercept, 𝑒 is the residual, and 𝑏 = 𝑒𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 0 𝑜𝑟 1. If 𝑏 = 1
non-stationarity exists within our data set. If b=0 the data is stationary.
Non-stationarity would mean that correlation between the two periods cannot be
statistically rejected and it would legitimize the use of Brownian motion over a mean
reverting process. If correlation between prices in last period and this period can be
rejected, the unit root test will reject the null. In this case the mean reverting process is the
preferred assumption.
We conducted two unit root tests.5 We first conducted a Dickey Fuller test based
on a specification where only lagged wholesale gasoline real price was included as an
explanatory variable of gasoline wholesale real price at time 𝑡. We then conducted another
Dickey Fuller test on a specification where wholesale gasoline price at time 𝑡 is regressed
on lagged real prices at time 𝑡 − 1 and drift. The null hypothesis was that the data followed
a non-stationary process and that the price in this period was perfectly correlated with the
price last period. The test fails to reject nonstationarity with the first specification (test
statistic of -1.48) but the test rejects nonstationarity under the second specification (test
statistic of -3.50). These answers give conflicting results. Failing to reject nonstationarity
would suggest that Brownian motion would be an appropriate approximation to the DGP
but rejecting nonstationarity would favor approximation with a mean reversion process.

5

Dickey Fuller tests were run with STATA based on historical gasoline prices displayed in Figure 3.1
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Dixit and Pindyck argue that prices of commodities such as oil follow a mean
reverting process. Under this assumption, prices below the projected level have a tendency
to increase and prices above the projected level have a tendency to decrease.
They assert that testing for autocorrelation should be done over the largest time period
possible (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). While this adds robustness to a unit root test, and data
for the past hundred years is available, the market structure for gasoline has drastically
changed in the past decade and incorporating too many years detracts from the legitimacy
of modeling the current market.
Despite these conflicting results, a strong case for using the Brownian motion form
can be made. There has been a large amount of debate in the literature over the similarity
in results given by models using Brownian motion assumptions and those resulting from
use of mean reversion assumptions (Metcalf and Hassett, 1995, Pindyck, 1999, Sarkar,
2003). Specifically the debate has been on whether Brownian motion can be used as an
approximation for a mean reversion process without compromising the reliability of
results. Mean reversion has the advantage of being a more reasonable assumption in many
markets due to economic factors working to bring the price of a product back to its marginal
cost of production. An example of this would be additional plants entering the industry
under high prices or plants leaving the industry under low prices. The problems are that
these marginal costs sometimes shift confounding predictions made by mean reversion,
and calculations for trigger prices under mean reversion assumptions can be cumbersome
(Metcalf and Hassett, 1995). Brownian motion has the advantage of analytical tractability
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). In other words, problems modeled using Brownian motion can
be solved by solving formulas and give actual answers rather than forcing data through a
program that gives approximations.
A mean reverting process converges asymptotically to a Brownian motion process
as the rate of mean reversion tends to zero. If the speed of reversion, ɳ, equals zero then a
mean reversion process and a Brownian motion process will give the exact same answer
(Metcalf and Hassett, 1995, Pindyck, 1999, Sarkar, 2003). Therefore Pindyck and Metcalf
argue that a Brownian motion is a good approximation even if the true DGP is a meanreverting one as long as the speed of reversion is low (Metcalf and Hassett, 1995, Pindyck,
1999). Moreover, volatility also affects the appropriateness of using GBM to approximate
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the DGP (Metcalf and Hassett, 1995, Pindyck, 1999). Results from a GBM approximation
to the DGP are less reliable, the higher the volatility 𝜎 of the random variable. Metcalf and
Hassett (1995) conducted sensitivity analysis and found that under a yearly volatility of
(𝜎 = 0.25) and a mean-reversion coefficient of ɳ=0.09, a GBM approximation results in
trigger prices that deviate from those of mean reversion by only 2% (Metcalf and Hassett,
1995).
Since we have calculated volatility in our DGP, we now proceed to calculate the
rate (if any) of mean reversion to determine the appropriateness of a GBM as an
approximation to the DGP. To determine the reversion speed of 𝑃 we regressed gasoline
wholesale prices over the past twenty years on its lagged price and drift rate; i.e. 𝑃𝑡+1 −
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ɳ((𝑃µ
𝑡 ) − 𝑃𝑡 ). Where 𝑃𝑡+1 − 𝑃𝑡 is the annual change in price, 𝛽0 is the
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
intercept of the equation, ((𝑃µ
𝑡 ) − 𝑃𝑡 ) is the difference in mean price and actual price,
and ɳ is the reversion speed. Estimation results in yearly ɳ = 0.66
Technology and Pathways
Before getting into cost estimation it is important to note that there are multiple
pathways to producing second generation biofuel and that different pathways can have very
different costs and yields. This section explains the different pathways that exist and why
we pick the pathways that we do. There are three main types of second-generation
technology that converts cellulosic biomass into biofuels. These technologies are
gasification, hydrolysis, and fast pyrolysis (Brown and Brown, 2013, Hughes, et al., 2013).
There have been numerous variations of these three base technologies in small scale pilot
plants but they still are primarily based off one of these three technologies. Gasification
uses high heat and low oxygen to turn the feedstock into syngas, it then adds catalysts to
this syngas to convert it to liquid fuels (Brown and Brown, 2013). Hydrolysis converts
plant cellulosic material to sugars after the material is broken down through either
enzymes, chemicals, or pressure. These sugars are then turned into fuel through a
fermentation process that is typically driven by E. coli and S. cerevisiae bacteria (Hughes,
et al., 2013).
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The final technology, and the one used in this paper, is fast pyrolysis. This process
can be roughly simplified into five steps.
1. Biomass pre-treatment
2. Fast Pyrolysis
3. Solids Removal
4. Oil Collection
5. Oil Upgrading

Figure 3.2: Steps of Converting Corn Stover to Bio Gasoline Using Fast Pyrolysis, (taken
and modified from Wright et al., 2010)
The first step of fast pyrolysis is the pretreatment process. Stover is collected and
ground to pieces that are 10 mm in diameter which makes them easier to dry. The stover is
then dried to a moisture content of 7%. It is then ground again to pieces that are only 3mm
in diameter. This small diameter assures that the stover will be efficiently used by the
equipment.
The second step is the pyrolysis itself, more specifically fast pyrolysis. In this
process the pre-treated biomass is sent to a pyrolysis reactor. This reactor rapidly heats
stover to approximately 480𝑜 𝐶. This rapid heating converts the biomass to a gaseous state.
This gas contains char, bio-oil, and non-condensable gases (NCG’s) such as carbon
monoxide and methane.
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During the third step these gases evaporate from the pyrolysis reactor and are sent
through cleaning equipment (either a turbine or filter) to separate the char from the gas.
The char must be collected due to its high carbon and ash content which would harm the
process to further refine the bio-oil. This collected char is then either sold as a marketable
co product or can be combusted and its heat is used to assist both steps one and two for
drying and pyrolysis respectively. Some plants also use this char to also produce electricity
which is then used to run the plant and/or sold to the grid.
The forth step of this process is oil collection. During this step, the remaining gas
net of the char is sent through an indirect heat exchanger. This rapidly cools that gas to
1500 𝐶. Bio-oil becomes liquid at these lower temperatures and is collected. Like their
name would imply NCG’s stay in their vapor form, this vapor is collected and combusted
along with the char to provide heat for pyrolysis and drying.
During the fifth step the bio oil then can go through one of two processes to further
reduce the oxygen content and refine it to a usable fuel, bio-gasoline or bio-diesel. The first
option is fluid catalytic cracking (FCC). In FCC the bio-oil gets depolymerized and further
deoxygenated. This creates hydrocarbons which can then be blended with existing
hydrocarbon-based biofuels (Brown and Brown, 2013). The second option is
hydrotreatment. Hydrotreatment further reduces the oxygen content, and stimulates the
depolymerization of bio-oil by adding hydrogen and refines it into a useable fuel such as
bio-gasoline or bio-diesel. This paper assumes a hydrotreatment process for the refining
of bio oil. Hydrotreatment is chosen as the process of converting bio-oil to bio-gasoline
since has higher yields and more favorable economics than FCC (Brown and Brown, 2013).
Hydroprocessing is a general term that includes two separate processes,
hydrotreatment and hydrocracking. During hydrotreatment bio-oil is subjected to high
pressure (1000-1500psi), and temperatures (3000 − 4000 𝐶). There is also large amounts
of hydrogen added to the bio-oil during this step. This combination of temperature,
pressure, and hydrogen removes impurities such as nitrogen and sulfur from the bio-oil.
The second step of hydroprocessing is hydrocracking. During this step even higher
pressures and temperatures, 4000 − 4500 𝐶

and 1500 − 2000 𝑝𝑠𝑖, are used to

depolymerize the molecules found in bio-oil into shorter chains which are chemically
similar to fossil fuel based gasoline. Both of these processes further reduce the oxygen
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content found in the bio-oil until it is at a point low enough where the upgraded product
can be used as a drop in fuel, in our case bio-gasoline. Once hydroprocessing is complete
we are left with our drop in biofuel, which is ready to be blended or directly sold.
Choosing a pathway for biofuel production is challenging. The estimates for yield
and cost of different technologies change every few months. This paper attempted to use
the timeliest numbers possible for the existing technologies but even these are subject to
change at a moment’s notice. The technology evolves very rapidly. Potentially hydrolysis
is just one new bacteria strain away from becoming the least attractive to the most attractive
second-generation technology. Having said this, there are several arguments for assuming
a fast pyrolysis with hydrotreatment as the pathway of choice. The only existing large scale
plant has adopted a variation of this technology so there is a precedent for it. A
corporation’s job is to maximize its profits, this can only be done with the most cost
effective technology. Another argument is that currently hydrolysis is a fairly outdated
technology that is better suited for ethanol production. Hydrolysis makes sugars which
work well for refining into ethanol but are harder to refine into a drop in. Currently, there
are no planned drop-in plants that use hydrolysis as a pathway (Brown and Brown, 2013).
The economics and chemistry do not line up. Gasification also experiences the unfavorable
economics compared to fast pyrolysis. In a Techno Economic Analysis (TEA) study,
conducted by Tristan Brown and Robert Brown at Iowa State University, fast pyrolysis
was found to be considerably more cost effective than both hydrolysis and gasification.
The lowest minimum fuel selling price (MFSP) for Fast Pyrolysis was found to be under
half that of both hydrolysis and gasification pathways. The MFSP for a gallon of biofuel
on these processes were $2.00, $5.00, and $4.50 respectively (Brown and Brown, 2013).
Fixed and Operating Costs
Now that the pathway is known it is possible to parameterize our costs. This paper,
unless otherwise noted takes its assumptions for fixed and operating costs from (Brown, et
al., 2013). These costs are summarized at the end of the section in Table 3.3. Brown’s paper
does an NPV analysis for a second generation drop-in biofuel plant over different regions;
Brown models a plant that processes 2000 dry tons of stover a day. This paper takes
Brown’s numbers for cost and converts them into a per gallon basis. The operating cost 𝑤,
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is calculated by taking Brown’s estimation of yearly operating cost plus our calculations
for capital replacement and federal tax. Capital replacement is added into w to replace
capital at the rate it is used up to ensure an infinite life of the plant; this infinite life
assumption is required for real options analysis. Federal tax is added to keep the project
more realistic for our analysis. This yearly operating cost is then divided by the number of
gallons of biofuel the plant produces a year. This paper breaks operating cost into four
categories, stover cost, hydrogen cost, cost of replacing capital, and miscellaneous.
This paper calculates the cost of replacing capital by annualizing capital cost and
converting it to a per gallon basis. This model also attempts to incorporate corporate
income tax into its operating cost expense. For this to work with a real options model, a
conversion is necessary to keep the tax constant and in per gallon terms. Traditional income
taxes overcomplicate the real options model and cause it to break down (Niemann and
Sureth, 2004). We assume an effective tax rate on net income to be 20%, that 20% will be
levied on the predicted taxable net revenue over the twenty year period, and converted to
a per gallon basis. We then take the NPV of these and annualize it to come up with a
constant tax that is paid every year. This paper also assumes that a company can pay
negative tax. We assume the plant is part of a larger company and that a negative tax owed
within the biofuel plant can be sent to another part of the company to cancel out that tax;
this is relevant for early years when the plants costs are higher than its revenue.
There are several subsidies and tax breaks currently in the industry. However, due
to their uncertain future this paper omits all of them and looks at trigger prices free of
policy.
As previously mentioned most of this paper’s operating costs come from the
predictions in Brown’s paper “Regional Differences in the Economic Feasibility of
Advanced Biorefineries: Fast Pyrolysis and Hydroprocessing,” (Brown, et al., 2013). One
exception to this is the cost of corn stover. The literature gives a wide range of predictions
on the cost of corn stover. The predicted cost for one dry metric ton of stover delivered to
plant ranges from approximately $16 to $112. (Fiegel, et al., Gallagher, et al., 2003). Other
predictions fall into a range between $40 to $101 (Brechbill, et al., 2011, Brown, et al.,
2013, Gonzalez, et al., 2012, Perrin, et al., 2012).
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These discrepancies in predicted cost exist since the corn stover market remains
largely undeveloped and on a very small scale. Due to this infancy in the industry,
assumptions for the impact of stover harvest on next year’s crop yield, the amount of
fertilizer required to replace the nutrients lost from stover harvest, and the price required
to induce enough farmers to collect stover to supply a biofuel plant are challenging. The
fact that these impacts are experienced differently across areas with disparate corn yields,
weather, tillage, and soil type compounds the prediction problem (Wilhelm, et al., 2004).
These things can be asymmetrical in different parts of the same field, let alone across an
entire region.
The assumption made in Brown’s previously mentioned paper is $101 per dry ton
of stover. This seems to be on the high end of most of the predictions. The assumption
made in this study is that a refinery can buy a ton of stover at $83 a dry ton. This assumption
is used since it falls towards the middle of the other predictions. It is also the assumption
used in another of Brown’s papers “Techno-Economic Analysis of Biomass to
Transportation Fuels and Electricity via Fast Pyrolysis and Hydroprocessing,” (Brown and
Brown, 2013) as well as a (Wright, et al., 2010). While $83 a ton may seem conservative
compared with other $100 plus predictions, this paper contests that any second-generation
biofuel plants that come online in the near future will likely pick a location that has
favorable conditions for collecting stover, conditions that keep both the opportunity and
monetary cost of stover harvest low.
There was also disagreement on the yield of bio-gasoline per dry ton of feedstock.
The predictions were, 72 gallons of bio-gasoline per dry ton and 85 gallons of bio-gasoline
per dry metric ton, made by Kior and Brown, respectively (Brown, et al., 2013, Digest,
2013). Kior’s assumption is used in this paper. As of right now, they are the only
commercial scale cellulosic biofuel drop-in plant. They would know what their own yields
are. It is important to note that some studies suggest up to a ten percent yield reduction
converting from yellow pine to corn stover for a feedstock (Brown, et al., 2013, Demirbas,
2011). Kior’s primary feedstock is yellow pine but they claim they can use stover just as
easily without mentioning a yield loss so this is the number that will be used. With these
assumptions in mind the cost of corn stover per gallon of biofuel is projected to be $1.15
per gallon in real terms.
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Table 3.1 illustrates the calculated components that make up this models operating
cost. All these components, with the exception of capital replacement cost, were calculated
from Brown’s paper. In Brown they were listed as yearly costs but this paper converted
them to a per gallon basis for the model. These individual values only have a direct
importance to our analysis in how they affect w. It is however interesting to include them
to illustrate what 𝑤 is actually composed of. Almost half of 𝑤 comes from stover cost,
approximately one third comes from capital replacement, and about a fifth comes from
hydrogen. These three expenses drive the operating cost for cellulosic bio gasoline
production. A plants operating cost is very sensitive to these two inputs.
It should be noted that part of the costs in the miscellaneous category are negative.
Char has multiple productive uses, this model assumes that the char left over from pyrolysis
is burnt and converted to electricity. This electricity runs the plant and the excess is sold to
the grid. Building electricity into the operating cost is required for our model, but it does
understate miscellaneous cost by about $0.20 a gallon.
Table 3.1: Operating Costs per Gallon for Project.
Stover
Hydrogen
Depreciation upkeep
Misc

$
$
$
$

1.15
0.51
0.79
0.11

Total investment cost is calculated to be $429,000,000 and total yearly operating
cost is $121,491,887. After calculating and converting the cost variables found in the
literature, operating cost (including stover cost) is equal to 𝑤 = $2.56 per gallon and
capital cost is equal to 𝑘 = $9.91 per gallon of plant capacity. Typically a plant pays its
capital costs fully or partially with financing which would be spread out over a number of
years. Real options does not allow for this, and 𝑘 must be paid all at once. Our model
assumes 100% loan financing for only the three years of construction. We then took the
principal of this loan after three years, paid it all at once, and divided by output per year to
get 𝑘. Notice that the financing assumption was only used to calculate the principal, it was
not assumed to be paid back over twenty years.
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In this paper, capital cost 𝑘, is calculated as the present value of investment cost.
The construction period is three years. The plant pays back the investment cost with interest
in full after three years of construction. This cost is then divided by the total number of
gallons produced in a year to get 𝑘. Think of 𝑘 as the capital cost per gallon of plant
capacity. Investment cost parameters are summarized in the following table.
Table 3.2: Assumptions for Financing
Parameter
Investment cost
Construction time

Value
$429,000,000
3 years

Source
Brown et al. 2013
Wright et al. 2010

% of investment in year one

8%

Wright et al. 2010

% of investment in year two

60%

Wright et al. 2010

% of investment in year three

32%

Wright et al. 2010

Interest rate

7.5%

Wright et al. 2010

PV of investment cost (after interest)

$470,350,236

Author's calculation

Gallons of bio-gasoline produced per year 4744800 gallons

Author's calculation

The parameters 𝐸𝑚 , 𝑟, 𝑙, and 𝑚 are all calculated as percentages of 𝑘. Due to the
infancy of this industry, there is little literature on the costs associated with mothballing
and reactivation for second generation drop in biofuel plants. Our assumptions reflect those
of Schmitt’s paper which models a real options analysis for a first generation corn ethanol
plant. Using these assumptions 𝑚 was calculated as .025𝑘 and 𝑙 was calculated as 0.25𝑘
(Schmit, et al., 2009). This paper made slight modifications for Schmitt’s assumptions for
𝐸𝑚 and 𝑟. Schmitt assumes that 𝐸𝑚 =.05𝑘 and that 𝑟=0.1𝑘. These numbers are taken from
the calculated 𝐸𝑚 equaling .03k for a methanol facility. They increase 𝐸𝑚 to .05𝑘 due to
their smaller plant sizes. 𝑟 is equal to 2𝐸𝑚 (Schmit, et al., 2009). These numbers seem
overstated since our paper looks at plants that are both larger and have a higher proportion
of total spending sunk into capital. Our plant is approximately four times larger than even
the largest ethanol plants in Schmitt’s study. A first generation plant has a discounted
operating to capital cost ratio of just over five and a half to one. In other words, over a
plant’s life they will pay five and a half times as much for operating expenses as they do
for capital in present value terms. The assumptions made in this paper put this ratio of
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discounted operating costs to capital at just over two and a half to one. These plants have
so much more capital than first generation plants that it makes sense that there would be
economies of scale in both reactivation and in mothballing fixed cost. With this in mind
we set 𝐸𝑚 =0.025𝑘 and 𝑟=0.05𝑘.
Table 3.3: Assumptions of All Parameters Used in this Study.
Parameter

Definition

µ

Drift rate
Standard
deviation
Discount rate
Interest rate
Operating
cost
Mothball
maintenance
cost

σ
δ
i
w
m
k

Capital cost

l

Scrap value

Em
r

Mothball
fixed cost
Reactivation
cost

Value

Scale

Source

1.85%

per year

EIA 2014

.209

per year

EIA 2014

10.00%
7.50%

per year
per year

Brown et al. 2013
Brown et al. 2013

per gallon produced

Brown et al. 2013

per gallon produced

Schmit et al. 2009

$2.56
$0.25
$9.91
$2.48
$0.25
$0.50

per gallon of total capacity Brown et al. 2013
per gallon of total capacity Schmit et al. 2009
per gallon of total capacity Schmit et al. 2009
per gallon of total capacity Schmit et al. 2009
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS

Trigger prices resulting from numerical solution of the system (21)-(28) are
reported in Table 4.1. Trigger prices of entry, mothball, reactivation, and exit are denoted
by 𝑃ℎ , 𝑃𝑚 , 𝑃𝑟 , and 𝑃𝑙 respectively. Entry and exit trigger prices calculated without
managerial flexibility (without mothballing and reactivation) were obtained from value
matching and smooth pasting conditions depicted in Appendix 2 are also reported in Table
4.1 and denoted as 𝑃̂ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃̂𝑙 . Entry and exit trigger prices under break-even and
Marshelian exit assumptions are also calculated and reported in Table 4.1 for comparison
with real options. We also calculate an NPV entry price that demands an 80% chance of
economic profit when our risk level is considered 𝑁𝑃𝑉80% . This illustrates the difference
in an NPV break-even analysis and what is the case for real life investment. Investors would
want better than a fifty percent chance of making money.
Table 4.1: Trigger Prices in Dollars per Gallon for Our Break-even, Marshelian, NPV 80%
Chance of Profitability, Real Options with Managerial Flexibility, and Real Options
without Managerial Flexibility Analysis.
Trigger
Price
𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ

Price Trigger
Occurs
$
2.89

𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑙
𝑃ℎ
𝑃𝑙
𝑃𝑚

$
$
$
$

2.29
4.97
1.91
1.91

Break-even exit price
RO entry price with managerial flexibility
RO exit price with managerial flexibility
RO mothball price with managerial flexibility

𝑃𝑟
𝑃̂ℎ
𝑃̂𝑙

$
$
$

2.89
4.98
1.90

RO reactivation price with managerial flexibility
RO entry without managerial flexibility
RO exit without managerial flexibility

𝑊ℎ
𝑊𝑙
𝑁𝑃𝑉80%

$
$
$

3.29
2.76
3.51

Marshallian entry price
Marshallian exit price
NPV with an 80% chance of profit

Definition
Break-even entry price
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It can be concluded from the table that uncertainty plays a major role in both the
decision to enter and the decision to exit. The real options entry trigger price 𝑃ℎ was 51%
above the Marshallian entry price 𝑊ℎ and 71% above the break even entry price
𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ . 𝑃ℎ was 42% higher than an NPV entry with an 80% chance of economic profit,
𝑁𝑃𝑉80% . Real option exit trigger price 𝑃𝑙 was 31% lower than the Marshallian exit price
𝑊𝑙 . 𝑃𝑙 was 17% lower than 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑙 . 6The uncertainty combined with irreversibility within
our real options analysis caused plants to demand a higher price to invest and accept a
lower price before exiting compared to traditional approaches. For our given level of
uncertainty and drift rate it appears that break even greatly underestimates the price at
which a firm will enter for a second generation drop in biofuel plant. It however also causes
firms to accept lower prices for exit, although not as dramatically. Managerial flexibility
has very little impact. Having the decision to mothball and reactivate later affects entry
price by $0.01 per gallon. The effects on exit trigger prices are more pronounced for higher
levels of uncertainty. At our base levels however 𝑃𝑙 is actually $0.01 more than 𝑃̂𝑙 . A plant
with the ability to reduce economic losses while waiting for conditions to improve will
have no effect until standard deviation reaches 0.25 which will be discussed later. For
levels higher than this it will allow plants to stay in business longer than one that cannot.7
Figure 4.1 shows how uncertainty affects the trigger price for entry at different
levels. This graph uses 𝑃̂ℎ (which ignores the options of mothball and reactivation) so that
the effect of uncertainty is not confounded with managerial flexibility. The difference
between 𝑃ℎ and 𝑃̂ℎ is minimal. This is due to the fact that the value of the option to mothball
is very low at entry trigger prices. 𝑃ℎ was omitted to keep the graph cleaner and not be
redundant. The gap between 𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ and 𝑃̂ℎ is very low when 𝜎 = 0. (The difference at 0%

6

In this paper the break-even and Marshallian approaches are slightly modified from a traditional breakeven. A standard break-even or Marshallian analysis would not include a yearly cost to replace capital. It
would instead have a finite project life and only calculate depreciation for tax purposes. This modification
was made to make our comparison consistent with real options, even if it does diverge from a traditional
NPV break-even analysis.
Our results comparing 𝑃𝑙 to 𝑊𝑙 and 𝑃ℎ to 𝑃̂ℎ initially appears at odds with what the literature would suggest.
There is however nothing intuitively incorrect with our assumptions. Both of these comparisons yield
expected results with higher levels of uncertainty. For low levels of uncertainty they give conflicting results
because of the drift rate more strongly affecting 𝑊𝑙 than 𝑃𝑙 . For low levels of uncertainty, the mandatory
mothball state costs more than it is worth. This makes the firm want to exit before it mothballs. Both of these
situations will be discussed in more detail.
7
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is caused by the drift rate, which will be discussed further in graph 4.3.) Increasing the
uncertainty has no effect on break even 𝑊ℎ since break even only considers the expected
value. 𝑃̂ℎ however, continually increases with uncertainty. Higher uncertainties increase
the option value of waiting to invest, which in turn cause the firm to demand a higher
premium for entry. When 𝜎 reaches 60% the firm requires, to enter the market, a price
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more than 2.5 times higher than the break-even price under NPV.
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Figure 4.1: Entry Trigger Prices over Different Levels of Uncertainty.
Uncertainty and irreversibility in investment may result in hysteresis in firm
behavior. Hysteresis may be thought of as inaction. Firms are less responsive to
profitability signals because they are anticipating potential changes in these signals in the
future. We now explore hysteresis in the case of biofuel firms that have the option to
mothball and reactivate. In particular Figure 4.2 illustrates the link between uncertainty
and hysteresis. The gap between 𝑃ℎ and 𝑃𝑙 in Figure 4.2 can be thought of as a firm’s
limited response zone. An idle firm will not enter the market until gasoline price becomes
greater than or equal to 𝑃ℎ . If a firm is already active, it will not exit the market until
gasoline price falls below 𝑃𝑙 . Therefore if the price of gasoline is between 𝑃ℎ and 𝑃𝑙 no
entry or exit will occur in this market. The main insight provided by Figure 4.2 is that an
increase in gasoline price volatility, which has been the case over the past decade (EIA
2014) makes firm entry into the market more unlikely and it makes exit of firms already in
operation also more unlikely. This result suggests that, if policies designed to support
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biofuels remain unadjusted, recent increases in gasoline price volatility, may have greatly
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diminished their effectiveness, and their likelihood of success.
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Figure 4.2: The Effect of Uncertainty on the Wedge between Ph and Pl.
The inactivity zone under breakeven and Marshelian analysis is constant for all
levels of uncertainty. Using break-even a firm will enter if
that same firm would only leave if

𝑃
𝛿−µ

≤

𝑤
𝜕

𝑃
𝛿−µ

≥

𝑤
𝛿

+ 𝑘. Once entered

+ 𝑙. A firm will enter the industry if their

discounted price covers their discounted operating costs and lump sum capital cost. They
will leave once their discounted price falls below their discounted operating costs plus the
lump sum value the firm receives for selling their plant upon leaving the industry. For NPV
break-even analysis the zone of inaction occurs because difference between 𝑘 and 𝑙. Under
our assumptions, this inactivity zone is equal to $0.60 per gallon.
Criteria for Marshallian entry and exit is similar, the difference being Marshallian
assumes both constant cost and price, and uses interest payments on capital, 𝑖𝑘 to calculate
capital cost rather than capital’s present value 𝑘. A firm will enter if it can cover its average
cost, 𝑊ℎ ≥ 𝑤 + 𝑖𝑘. If a firm cannot cover their average cost in the long run they will exit
𝑊𝑙 ≤ 𝑤 + 𝑖𝑙. The inactivity zone associated with Marshallian entry and exit also occurs
because of the difference between entry capital cost and exit capital cost. Under our
assumptions it is equal to $0.53.
Real options analysis, on the other hand, has more flexibility. Its inaction zone is
between mothballing and reactivation trigger prices. In real options the wedge between

0.6

32
entry and exit is known as the firm’s limited response zone, this zone increases with
uncertainty and is considerably larger than its break-even/Marshelian exit counterpart.
Under our assumptions of σ=0.209 and µ=1.85% the inaction zone between 𝑃ℎ and 𝑃𝑙 is
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Figure 4.3: The Impact of Uncertainty on Hysteresis with Plant Flexibility.
Figure 4.3 additionally incorporates the trigger prices for mothball and reactivation
over different levels of uncertainty. These interactions between entry, mothballing,
reactivation, and exit, show us how a plant will respond to different bio gasoline prices at
different levels of uncertainty. There is a hysteresis between the mothball and reactivation
price that grows with uncertainty. An active firm will wait longer to mothball under higher
levels of uncertainty and a mothball firm will wait longer under higher levels of uncertainty
to reactivate. Figure 4.3 shows some interactions between trigger prices that may seem
counter intuitive for low levels of variability (levels below 0.30). The first of these is 𝑃𝑚
converging to 𝑃𝑙 . This is a function of how the equations are forced to interact in Matlab.
A firm must mothball before it exits. For low levels of uncertainty, there is little value to
the options that arise from being in a mothballed state, since prices are unlikely to change
enough to induce a state change. There is however a maintenance cost 𝑚 that must be paid
to stay in this state and a fixed cost 𝐸𝑚 to get to this state. This additional cost paired with
a low option value means that it would never be optimal for a firm to mothball. It would
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always exit before it considered mothballing. For a similar reason 𝑃𝑟 converges to 𝑃𝑙 for
low levels of uncertainty. A firm would not spend any time in the mothballed state and
would exit immediately. It would never have a chance to reactivate. 𝑃𝑚 and 𝑃𝑟 are trivial
under low levels of variability. For these low levels there is a mandatory fixed cost to
change states, and for a mothballed state an operating cost; this is paired with these options
having little value. In reality a firm would never consider mothballing for uncertainty
below .30 and as a result never would consider mothballing. Because of the previously
stated argument, we set 𝑃𝑟 and 𝑃𝑚 equal to 𝑊ℎ for levels of uncertainty that would have
yielded a result of a lower trigger price for them than the Marshelian exit price.
The positive drift rate calculated for wholesale gasoline price reveals an expected
improvement in profitability. We explore whether such expected improvement in future
profitability affects entry trigger price and to what extent that effect is magnified or
softened by uncertainty and irreversibility. As expected, increases in the drift rate reduce
entry trigger prices. As the prospects of the investment improve, plants require a lower
price to invest without delay. Figure 4.4 also reveals that uncertainty and irreversibility
soften the effect of an increase in the drift rate on entry trigger price; i.e. on Figure 4.4 the
slope for 𝑃̂ℎ is less steep than 𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ . The effect of an increased drift has conflicting effects
on 𝑃̂ℎ . Like break-even, a project that trends towards increasingly favorable situations
makes investment now more attractive since it lowers the likelihood of negative outcomes,
but it also increases the value of waiting. Waiting with a positive drift rate becomes more
valuable, because future prices are now discounted by (𝛿 − µ) instead of just 𝛿.
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We explore the sensitivity of hysteresis (the range of inaction) to the drift rate.
Results are displayed in Figure 4.5. Increases in drift rate have a close to proportional effect
on entry and exit trigger prices. Specifically, they decrease at a modest rate as the drift rate
increases. This furthers the argument that uncertainty and irreversibility are the important
drivers of hysteresis within the biofuel industry.
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Figure 4.5: The Effect that Yearly Drift Rate Has on the Hysteresis between 𝑷
Figure 4.6 and 4.7 show how much of the gap between 𝑁𝑃𝑉ℎ (𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑙 ) and 𝑃ℎ (𝑃𝑙 )
is explained by uncertainty, and how much comes from the additional flexibility in decision
making our model adds that break-even and Marshelian theory do not account for. In other
words, the option to mothball and reactivate make the plant more realistic but it makes the
trigger price for exit lower than it would be if we were to compare NPV break even entry
and exit to a real options analysis that only had options for entry and exit. This is due to
being able to mothball to reduce losses in the event that conditions become unfavorable
and reactivate it if conditions improve later for a reactivation price less than k. In other
words it gives an additional value to waiting that doesn’t have a counterpart in break-even.
When doing a real options analysis that modeled just idle and active states the 𝑃̂ℎ and 𝑃̂𝑙
under the same parameters as our previous analysis, yielded prices of $4.98 and $1.90
respectively. 𝑃ℎ and 𝑃̂ℎ hardly differ since 𝑃ℎ is much higher than 𝑃𝑚 ; with our given level
of variability and positive drift it is unlikely that a price would fall far enough to mothball.
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Since this is unlikely the option value to mothball when a firm is experiencing 𝑃ℎ is very
low, it would not outweigh the fixed and operating cost of mothballing.
The impact that managerial flexibility has on 𝑃𝑙 is clear. A firm will wait longer to
exit if it has the option to reduce its losses and reactivate in the future. This lowering of the
exit trigger price will increase the hysteresis between entry and exit. In our analysis this
holds true for any standard deviation greater than 0.22. The reason this is not the case for
all levels of uncertainty is that for low levels of uncertainty the cost of mothballing does
not outweigh the option value of being able to reactivate in the future. The impact that
managerial flexibility has on 𝑃ℎ is less clear. It has very little effect on it which makes
sense given how unlikely it is at high prices, that mothballing would be used. Overall the
effect that managerial flexibility has on 𝑃ℎ is trivial but it is important to explain why it
changes.
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Figure 4.6: Effect of Managerial Flexibility on the Decision to Enter.
Figure 4.6 shows how small of an effect that managerial flexibility actually has on
the decision to enter for different levels of uncertainty. The lines for 𝑃ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃̂ℎ fall right
on top of one another. Uncertainty affects the decision to enter for a plant with, and a plant
without managerial flexibility the same. This furthers the argument that at the high prices
required for entry 𝑃ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃̂ℎ are so far away from 𝑃𝑚 that the option has no value at this
point.
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Figure 4.7 shows how managerial flexibility effects exit. In figure 4.6 we saw that
flexibilities affect on entry is negligible. For our given level of uncertainty Managerial
flexibility has no meaningful effect on 𝑃𝑙 either. Managerial flexibility does however have
an impact on 𝑃𝑙 for higher levels of uncertainty. For a standard deviation of .6 a firm will
leave the industry $0.36 sooner if they do not have the option to reduce their variable costs
until market conditions improve to a point where they can reactivate. This makes sense
since 𝑃𝑚 is much closer to 𝑃𝑙 than it is to 𝑃ℎ . The value option to mothball has an inverse
relationship with price.

Trigger price in dollars

$3.00
$2.50
$2.00
$1.50
$1.00
$0.50
$0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

The yearly standard deviation of a 1% change in gasoline price
Real options exit trigger price with managerial flexibility
Real options exit trigger price with no managerial flexibility

Figure 4.7: The Effect of Managerial Flexibility on the Decision to Exit.
Plants are willing to stay in the market and bear higher losses if they have the option
to mothball which reduces these losses to only m per gallon instead of P-w per gallon, and
reactivate in the future if prices improve. This explanation is apparent anywhere between
0.22 to 0.6 standard deviation. From 0 to 0.22 however there is another affect that
outweighs the option value of mothballing which causes 𝑃𝑙 to actually be greater than 𝑃̂𝑙 .
Option values increase with higher amounts of uncertainty. Under relatively low levels of
uncertainty the option does not hold much value. In addition to this our Bellman equations
are set up in a way that requires a firm to mothball before it exits. In the situation with
managerial flexibility, if a plant decides to exit it must pay fixed cost 𝐸𝑚 before it can leave
even if it goes directly from active to idle. This low option value paired with what is
essentially an additional cost to exit causes the firm to leave earlier in the situation where
it has flexibility than one where it does not.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

The large amount of existing literature puts the break-even entry price of a second
generation drop in biofuel plant anywhere between $2.00 to $2.70 a gallon for a
commercial scale plant (Anex, et al., 2010, Brown, et al., 2013, Digest, 2013, Jones, et al.,
2009, Petter and Tyner, 2014, Wright, et al., 2010). If we assume a biofuel selling price
equal to that of wholesale gasoline price, which is currently $2.79 a gallon, one would
expect that, even under the least promising break-even analysis, NPV for a second
generation biofuel plant would be greater than zero (EIA, 2014). It is important to note that
a positive NPV does not guarantee investment in the real world, if these NPV’s required
an economic gain with greater than 50% probability then this would not be the case. By
definition though this would require accounting for and building risk into the model.
Despite this positive NPV, the United States is in a situation where it is well short of its
Renewable Fuels Mandate for cellulosic biofuels every year. This shortfall has been
considerable. In 2013, cellulosic biofuel production totaled six million gallons. This falls
994 million gallons below the target goal of 1 billion gallons set by the Renewable Fuel
Standard (Schnepf and Yacobucci, 2010). This gap between the break even and actual price
is caused by uncertainty.
This chronic shortfall in investment in cellulosic biofuel plants is easily rationalized
when uncertainty and irreversibility, two distinctive features of this industry, are
considered. The market for gasoline has been known to be volatile. Using wholesale
monthly data over the last twenty years we calculated a yearly standard deviation of
gasoline price of just under .21. This volatility has a large effect on the option value of
waiting and gives us an entry trigger price of $4.98 per gallon under real options as opposed
to $2.89 and $3.29 per gallon, using NPV break even and Marshallian entry criteria
respectively. Both of which, emerge under conventional microeconomic theory (i.e. when
uncertainty and irreversibility are ignored). In other words gasoline prices have been high
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enough to induce investment under a break-even model that ignores uncertainty. Once
uncertainty and irreversibility are added into the calculation, prices fall well short of the
trigger price for entry. It then follows that uncertainty constitutes a significance barrier to
meeting the Renewable Fuel Standard for cellulosic biofuel.
Another conclusion to be drawn from the data is that once firms are in the industry
they will stay in longer before exiting under a real options analysis than they would under
a break-even/Marshelian analysis for all levels of uncertainty. Hysteresis between entry
and exit increases with higher levels of uncertainty. Drift rates also cause effect real options
differently than beak-even/Marshelian assumptions. They have a more modest effect on
real options due to the conflicting effect on the expected value and option value.
Using the insights from this study, this paper makes several recommendations that
could allow for meeting the Renewable Fuel Standard in a more cost effective way. Since
the RFS was started for cellulosic biofuels policies primarily have been designed to address
expected value, lowering costs, or offering attractive financing that improves NPV. All of
these policies will lower trigger price but none of them address uncertainty. Results in this
paper suggest that using government subsidies to reduce uncertainty may be more effective
than policies aimed at affecting mean return on investment. Some ideas for reducing
uncertainty have been developed in the literature. They include government subsidized
insurance that guarantees a minimum price and forward contracts that lock the producer
into a specific price in the future regardless of what the market does (Song, et al., Tyner,
et al., 2010). In theory these policies could dramatically reduce uncertainty inherent within
the cellulosic biofuel industry. It would be possible to adapt this RO analysis to these
policies by adding in parameters associated with a given policy and then resolving the
equations in Matlab. This is a topic of future research.
Following the same logic, the government could reduce the perceived risk in the
industry if they enforced existing mandates. The EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency) waives the RIN (Renewable Identification Number) mandate every year. Every
year congress debates what subsidies for biofuels they will cut. This uncertainty involved
within these already inefficient price subsidies makes them even less efficient to address
uncertainty. If the goal is to induce investment into cellulosic biofuel production, the
government could reduce the uncertainty involved in policy. While these previously
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mentioned policies for reducing uncertainty are important, and finding a most cost effective
one would require looking at them in a vacuum as I have discussed, this is not the whole
story. The reality is that for any producer to get financing, they need to be locked into a
long term offtake contract. This reality does not detract from the legitimacy of this paper
or looking at other policy options but it is something that should be considered when
thinking about second generation biofuel plant investment.
All of the assumptions for costs, prices, and technology where the most sensible
under current information; these can however change as technology and markets evolve
and could significantly affect trigger prices. Stover accounts for about half of a biofuel
plants operating cost. Yet there is considerable uncertainty surrounding this coefficient as
well. Moreover the hydrogen being used in these plants comes from natural gas. Natural
gas prices have historically been even more volatile than gasoline. Prices for natural gas
could, and probably will change in the future. This would affect trigger prices. Currently
Pyrolysis is the most promising technology but a single innovation in an existing or new
technology could completely turn the tables, and alter the cost projections.
This paper modeled how changes in price can effect entry and exit into an industry.
While literature suggests that price is the largest determinant for entry. It is not however
the only determinant. Costs, yields, and government policy all carry with them a degree of
uncertainty for this new industry. An analysis done that incorporates the uncertainty
experienced by all of these variables would go a long ways in furthering the literature on
second generation drop in biofuel plants.
This study is not without limitations. While the study does account for uncertainty
in price, it does not account for the uncertainty inherent within production. The cost of
stover, hydrogen, even equipment can all vary over time. A model that accounts for
uncertainties full effect on entry trigger price would also incorporate the uncertainty on the
production side of cellulosic biofuels. This additional uncertainty would likely compound
the already large amount of hysteresis within the industry. This limitation could be
overcome by modeling a real options analysis for cellulosic biofuels using two stochastic
variables, one for price and one for cost. The purpose of this study, however, was to
determine the effect of uncertainty on output, arguably the main source of uncertainty, on
firm behavior.
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Another limitation of this study is that numbers for plant cost, capacity, and output
are speculative. Our study gathered numbers from the most reliable sources possible but
the fact of the matter is that, at the moment, only one large scale plant with this technology
has existed (i.e. KIOR) and even it recently went offline. All of our information was taken
from pilot plants, TEA’s, and modifications from cellulosic ethanol plants. These numbers
are the best estimations possible but they may change once data from actual large scale
plants becomes available. This could be remedied by re-doing this analysis in several years
when the technology is more proven and more reliable numbers exist.
The next logical step for this research would be to model government policy into
it. The study has already quantified the impact that uncertainty has on entry and exit from
the industry, it would be interesting to see the impact that each government policy, both in
place and proposed, would have on entry into the industry. More specifically the different
magnitudes that a fixed subsidy, variable subsidy, financing, futures contract, and the RFS
would have on trigger prices. (Song, et al., 2010, Tyner, et al., 2010). This would be done
by modifying the Bellman equations, specifically adding additional terms and parameters
to model the incentive being considered. Furthermore, these policies could be compared
on a cost effectiveness basis i.e. for every million dollars spent through a specific policy
how much does the trigger price decrease? Judging by our results for this study, a policy
that addresses uncertainty may be more cost effective than one that simply tries to increase
the expected price.
Another option for future research would be to model the externalities of cellulosic
biofuel production into the cost. More specifically if one could retrieve a value for the
amount of carbon reduced, domestic job creation, etc. from a gallon of biofuel it would be
possible to come up with a social trigger price for entry and exit that would reflect its social
value. The hypothesis would be that a gallon of drop in biofuel would have a different
value to society than a gallon of petroleum based fuel. This value could then be used to
justify the economically efficient level of government incentives to be used in the cellulosic
biofuel market.
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Appendix A: Numerical Analytical Approach in MatLab
Code
function F = ROA(x)
alpha=-2.0628;
beta=2.2155;
delta=0.1;
mu=.01854;
w=2.56;
k=9.91;
m=0.25;
em=0.25;
r=0.50;
l=-2.48;
F = [x(7)*(x(1)^beta)-x(1)*((delta-mu)^-1)+w*(delta^-1)-x(5)*(x(1)^alpha)+k;
x(3)*((delta-mu)^-1)-w*((delta)^-1)+x(5)*(x(3)^alpha)-x(6)*(x(3)^alpha)x(8)*(x(3)^beta)+m*(delta^-1)+em;
x(6)*(x(4)^alpha)+x(8)*(x(4)^beta)-m*(delta^-1)-x(4)*((delta-mu)^-1)+w*(delta^1)-x(5)*(x(4)^alpha)+r;
x(6)*(x(2)^alpha)+x(8)*(x(2)^beta)-m*(delta^-1)-x(7)*(x(2)^beta)+l;
beta*x(7)*(x(1)^(beta-1))-((delta-mu)^-1)-alpha*x(5)*(x(1)^(alpha-1));
((delta-mu)^-1)+alpha*x(5)*(x(3)^(alpha-1))-alpha*x(6)*(x(3)^(alpha-1))beta*x(8)*(x(3)^(beta-1));
alpha*x(6)*(x(4)^(alpha-1))+beta*x(8)*(x(4)^(beta-1))-((delta-mu)^-1)alpha*x(5)*(x(4)^(alpha-1));
alpha*x(6)*(x(2)^(alpha-1))+beta*x(8)*(x(2)^(beta-1))-beta*x(7)*(x(2)^(beta-1))];
Steps for solving
options = optimset ('MaxFunEvals',10000,'MaxIter',10000)
x0 = [5;1;1;2;1;1;1;1]; % Make a starting guess at the solution
[x,fval] = fsolve(@ROA6,x0,options)
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Appendix B: Equations Defining Value Matching and Smooth Pasting Conditions
Without the Managerial Flexibility to Mothball or Reactivate
Code
function F = ROA5(x)
alpha=-2.0628;
beta=2.2155;
delta=0.1;
mu=.01854;
w=2.2.56;
k=9.91;
l=-2.48;
F = [x(4)*(x(1)^beta)-x(3)*(x(1)^alpha)-x(1)*((delta-mu)^-1)+w*(delta^-1)+k;
beta*x(4)*(x(1)^(beta-1))-alpha*x(3)*(x(1)^(alpha-1))-((delta-mu)^-1);
x(3)*(x(2)^alpha)+x(2)*((delta-mu)^-1)-w*((delta)^-1)-x(4)*(x(2)^(beta))+l;
alpha*x(3)*(x(2)^(alpha-1))+((delta-mu)^-1)-beta*x(4)*(x(2)^(beta-1))];
Steps for solving
options = optimset ('MaxFunEvals',10000,'MaxIter',10000)
x0 = [4;1;1;1]; % Make a starting guess at the solution
[x,fval] = fsolve(@ROA5,x0,options)

